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Reporting from Paris on 11 November 1870, Daily News correspondent Henry Du Pré 
Labouchère wrote, “The ambulance which is considered the best is the American.  The wounded 
are under canvas, the tents are not cold, and yet the ventilation is admirable….It is the dream of 
every French soldier, if he is wounded, to be taken to this ambulance.”1  Also in 
the French capital during the Prussian siege, Wickham Hoffman, Secretary of the United States 
Legation at Paris, asserted that the American ambulance “was soon so well and so favorably 
known, that I heard of French officers who put cards in their pocket-books, on which they had 
written the request that if they were wounded they might be carried to l’ambulance 
américaine.”2  Other newspaper reporters, medical personnel, and bystanders—French and 
foreign—consistently described the American ambulance in similar positive terms throughout 
the duration of the siege from September 1870 until January 1871.  This acclamation was a result 
of the stark contrast between the sanitary conditions, organization, and medical success of the 
American ambulance and those of the majority of hospitals and ambulances operating during the 
Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent siege of Paris.  While French-sponsored medical 
facilities were often disorganized and unsanitary, the creators of the American ambulance 
developed an efficient system composed of clean, well-ventilated tents and practical ambulance 
wagons and staffed by experienced surgeons and devoted personnel.  Consequently, the patients 
in the American ambulance recovered more successfully than did the wounded placed in French-
sponsored ambulances and hospitals.   
This essay will provide a brief overview of the Franco-Prussian War and subsequent 
siege of Paris before moving to a discussion of the innovations surrounding voluntary aid to the 
                                                 
1 Henry Du Pré Labouchère, Diary of the Besieged Resident in Paris: Reprinted from “The Daily News,” with 
Several New Letters and Preface (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1871), 202. 
 
2 Wickham Hoffman, Camp, Court, and Siege: A Narrative of Personal Adventure and Observation During Two 
Wars, 1861-1865; 1870-1871 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), 226. 
 1
wounded as stipulated by the 1864 Geneva Convention.  An outline of France’s lack of proper 
medical preparation for war will serve as a precursor to a detailed examination of the functioning 
of military and civilian hospitals and ambulances during the siege of Paris; this examination will 
highlight the disorganization, unsanitary conditions, and abuses within the French-sponsored 
medical facilities.  A description of the establishment, form, and methods of the American 
ambulance will be followed by an examination of the various contemporary acclamations for the 
American ambulance’s service during the Prussian siege.  Finally, a short discussion of the 
differing mortality rates of the American ambulance and certain other Parisian ambulances and 
hospitals will solidify the contrasting effectiveness of each medical facility. 
On 19 July 1870, France’s Emperor Napoleon III declared war on Prussia.  France 
suffered its first major defeats in early August, and on 2 September Napoleon III surrendered to 
the Prussian forces at Sedan.  News of the Emperor’s capitulation reached Paris the following 
day, and on 4 September, the city’s republican deputies announced the fall of the Second Empire 
and the creation of the Third Republic.  As historian Melvin Kranzberg notes, “The defeat at 
Sedan did not mean the end of the war; it merely meant the closing of one phase of the campaign 
and the opening of another.”3  This second phase of the Franco-Prussian War was the siege of 
Paris, which began when the Prussians completed their encirclement of the French capital on 19 
September 1870.  Prussian artillery units began hurling shells into the city on 5 January 1871, 
and on 28 January, the French government agreed to an armistice with recently-unified 
Germany.  During these four months of siege and intermittent French sorties outside the city, 
Paris faced shortages of information, food, and fuel; it was within this milieu that the various 
ambulances and hospitals labored. 
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 In 1870 the term “ambulance” had a more diverse meaning than its present-day 
definition.  Betrand Taithe suggests that “the word ambulance [emphasis author’s]…had the 
double meaning of [a] wagon or carriage designed to transport wounded patients, and that of an 
improvised field hospital usually of more than six beds.”4  The presence of volunteer ambulances 
of various nationalities during the Franco-Prussian War and the siege of Paris was the result of 
the rules for voluntary aid for the wounded established during the 1864 Geneva Convention.  The 
war itself was “a watershed in the history of the relationship between war and charity: It 
provided opportunities for the aid societies of belligerents and neutrals to demonstrate their 
utility to army medical services and to the wounded themselves….”5   
 The road to the 1864 Geneva Convention began on 9 February 1863, as Gustave 
Moynier—president of the Geneva Society for Public Utility—and four other individuals met in 
Geneva to discuss the feasibility of creating voluntary relief committees and national aid 
societies for the wounded.  Establishing the International Committee to Assist the War Wounded 
on 17 February, the five individuals resolved to encourage governments throughout Europe to 
form similar committees.6  In October 1863, representatives from fourteen nations gathered in 
Geneva and formally decided “to support the establishment of committees of relief in all 
countries, the neutralization of personnel caring for the wounded, and the neutralization of the 
wounded themselves” and designated a red cross on a white armband as the approved badge of 
the neutral medical personnel.7 
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In August 1864, delegates from sixteen countries met in Geneva for the International 
Congress, and representatives from twelve of these nations eventually signed the Geneva 
Convention on 22 August.  The United States, wishing to maintain a neutral position in European 
affairs, sent only an unofficial representative and a member of the United States Sanitary 
Commission to Geneva.8  By signing the 1864 Geneva Convention, nations accepted the October 
1863 statutes for the organization of neutral battlefield hospitals and ambulance corps and for the 
voluntary creation of national relief societies within participant countries.9  The Geneva 
Convention did not formulate any legal or disciplinary measures to ensure the appropriate use of 
the Red Cross emblem.10  The abuses of the emblem and of the Convention article guaranteeing 
neutrality to individuals offering aid proved problematic during the Franco-Prussian War and the 
siege of Paris.  As John Hutchinson notes, “…It is remarkable that none of the delegates foresaw 
the likelihood that it [the Convention article explaining neutrality] would be abused.”11 
In his carefully researched study of French medicine and the defeat of 1870, Bertrand 
Taithe asserts that French medical practice in 1870 “was in a state of political crisis denounced 
by many.  Parisian medicine…did not enjoy the scientific prominence and the international 
culture hegemony of the first half of the century.”12  Although clinical medicine in Paris in 1870 
was at its apex in terms of diagnosis of ailments and pathological science, Parisian medicine was 
“very poor in [m]any other respects.”13  As Taithe explains, “The great wards of Parisian 
hospitals still functioned uniformly and indiscriminately.  The isolated patients could still be 
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treated by martyrdom-seeking nuns without much [sanitary] protection.”14  A comparison of 
mortality rates following surgery in civilian hospitals in London and in Paris provides an 
example of the generally poor sanitary conditions in Parisian hospitals.  Observations published 
by Dr. Matthew Berkeley-Hill and Dr. James Simpson in 1870 revealed that in six thousand 
cases of major operations in Parisian hospitals, the mortality rate was approximately 60 percent; 
conversely, London hospitals with more than three hundred beds never experienced mortality 
rates higher than 40 percent.15  Taithe sums up the pre-siege conditions of civilian hospitals: “It 
is still striking how far public health remained limited to the appearance [emphasis author’s] of 
cleanliness and order, and how hygiene had much more credence as a moral and policing concept 
than as a clinical one”16   
 Both the French army medical corps and the French voluntary aid society were ill 
prepared for the Franco-Prussian War.  French military surgeons and physicians lacked training 
and were not properly equipped for the conditions of war and siege; the low status of military 
medical staff, the dangerous working conditions, and a meager income all contributed to a 
shortage of well-trained individuals.17  From the beginning of the war, the inadequacy of the 
French army medical services was clear: “Many regiments did not dispose of the required 
number of medical officers.  Few in the army knew anything about the Geneva Convention and 
were either ready or willing to abide by its terms.”18  Additionally, at the outbreak of the war, the 
medical corps did not have an efficient method for transporting the wounded.19  As a result of 
these shortcomings, the French “were forced to delegate much of the [ambulance] responsibility 
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to charity and public-spirited voluntary nursing organizations.”20  In Dr. Thomas Evans’ lengthy 
history of the American ambulance, Dr. Edward Crane chastised the French army’s medical 
corps for having “neither the ability nor the courage to assume to provide for the multitude of 
sick and wounded, which it was certain would have to be taken care of during the [1870] 
campaign.”21 
 The French Society for Aid to Wounded Soldiers was founded in Paris in June 1864 in 
accordance with the October 1863 proposal for the voluntary establishment of national relief 
societies.  In the summer of 1870, the French Society assumed the role of managing the 
country’s various military and volunteer ambulances.22  This organization was also not prepared 
for the war and the siege.  Describing the pre-war existence of the French Society, Hutchinson 
points out that “no serious effort had been made to procure supplies, establish relations with the 
army or the medical profession, or train nurses and ambulance personnel….”23  The French 
Society was essentially a nonfunctioning organization prior to the Franco-Prussian War, 
resembling “a rather informal club of medical men…and benevolent aristocrats.”24  The 
organization’s lack of preparation for war was obvious to contemporary observers.  Professor 
Léon Le Fort, France’s expert in military surgery, commented, “When in July 1870 I took on the 
organization of the volunteer ambulances, I was astonished…to find neither material, nor 
medical personnel, nor plan of organization, nor money….”25  Dr. Crane echoed Le Fort’s 
sentiment, noting that “the evidence of the complete inefficiency of the volunteer system as 
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applied in France…is irrefutable, and the most remarkable circumstance is, that this evidence is 
supported by…those surgeons who had the direction of volunteer ambulances”26 
 As the Prussian forces surrounded Paris in mid-September, the city was taking the form 
of a “giant hospital” in which Parisians converted houses, apartments, hotels, and theaters into 
ambulances and temporary hospitals.27  Melvin Kranzberg provides an exhaustive list of the 
temporary hospitals formed in Paris before and during the siege.  He indicates that “the flag of 
the Red Cross waved from such varied buildings as the Odéon, Comédie-Française, Variétés, 
Lyrique, Port St. Martin, Cluny, and Belleville theaters, and from the Tuileries, Luxembourg, 
Elysées,...Corps Législatif, Palais de Justice, and the Café de la Cascade.”28  This list 
demonstrates the visual prominence of medical facilities during the siege of Paris, helping to 
explain the numerous references to ambulances and hospitals in the writings of observers within 
the besieged city.  Kranzberg is indeed correct in his assertion that “the service of hospitals and 
ambulances, whether native or foreigners, was one of the most prominent aspects of military 
activity during the siege.”29  Moreover, an assortment of ambulances served in and around Paris 
during the war and siege.  For instance, the British, Dutch, Irish, Austrian, and Belgian Red 
Cross societies sent personnel to France to provide medical aid.30  Some of these ambulances 
formed early in the Franco-Prussian War, while others, such as the American ambulance, 
functioned exclusively during the siege.  In addition to the more than two hundred ambulances 
sponsored by France’s institutional forms of civilian medical aid, other benefactors and groups 
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established 1,291 ambulances in the French capital.31  Taithe explains this proliferation of 
ambulances in Paris, noting that “the flag bearing a red cross validated the independent existence 
of hundreds of ambulances supported by religious orders, municipal authorities, companies, rich 
philanthropists…, Jewish, Protestant…, and Freemasons’ organizations, or even individuals.”32   
The combination of a large number of hospitals and ambulances and the inadequate 
preparations of both the French Society and the French army medical corps helped to foster an 
environment of medical disorganization in besieged Paris.  Rupert Christiansen asserts that the 
medical situation within the encircled city “verged on the chaotic.”33  Additionally, the Prussian 
siege exacerbated the pre-war shortcomings of both the French Society and France’s army 
medical corps.  Referencing French military medicine, Christiansen notes, “…As the number of 
casualties expanded, the extent of medical disorganization and incompetence became alarmingly 
apparent.”34  The medical corps lacked both a centralized system of monitoring the number of 
open beds in the Parisian ambulances and a reliable arrangement for isolating contagious 
patients.35  George Boyland, an assistant surgeon-major in a French army ambulance, maintained 
that “…no one director had charge of the whole medical service of the army, nor had any one the 
supervision of the city department—each ambulance seemed to work for itself.”36    
Like the army medical service, the French Society was generally disorganized throughout 
the siege.  Describing the Society’s activities, Hutchinson aptly states, “It soon became 
apparent…that enthusiasm and an air of authority were no substitute for a plan of 
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organization.”37  Dr. Crane assessed the French Society as being “almost constantly ignorant of 
the necessities of the several armies in the field.”38  Indeed, the organization’s executive council 
frequently outfitted ambulances with either too many or too few personnel or an insufficient 
amount of medical supplies.  For example, the French Society provided the Fifth Ambulance, 
staffed with 164 medical personnel, with only three vehicles for transportation of the wounded.39   
 Contemporary observers attested to the general disorder of the Parisian ambulances and 
hospitals.  Reflecting the mismanagement and confusion of medical services in Paris during the 
siege, witnesses pointed out the glut of personnel in certain ambulances and hospitals.  On 19 
November Henry Du Pré Labouchère wrote that, despite its large size, the hospital in the Grand 
Hôtel “seems to me overmanned, for the number of the healthy who receive pay and rations from 
its funds exceeds the number of the wounded.”40  Similarly, Felix Whitehurst believed that the 
disorganization in Paris resulted from the existence of too many ambulances and volunteer 
medical personnel.41 
This disorganization often caused confusion among the various ambulances.  Whitehurst 
described a scene in early December 1870—“the third day of the Great Battle of Paris”—in 
which multiple ambulances were summoned to bring additional medical supplies to a group of 
wounded soldiers; upon their arrival, however, the ambulance personnel realized that the 
wounded had been evacuated three hours earlier.42  Dr. Crane also observed the uncoordinated 
efforts of the French-sponsored medical services, asserting that “ambulances were sent off one 
after the other to grope their way…to the corps to which they had been assigned, or to hunt up 
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some special field of usefulness.”43  In his reflections on his service with an Anglo-American 
ambulance in the Franco-Prussian War, Charles Ryan noted that “…we cannot but remember the 
appalling disorganization and incompetence of the French voluntary ambulances, which were 
never found when wanted, and which when they did appear, brought with them little or nothing 
that was necessary to make a battlefield ambulance useful.”44   
 Onlookers frequently recorded instances of aid personnel misusing their positions in 
ambulances and hospitals.  This misuse generally took two forms.  First, individuals sometimes 
volunteered for ambulance service as a way to shirk military duty in the French army.  
Kranzberg indicates that “…many able-bodied ‘slackers’ found jobs in hospitals so that they 
would not have to face danger elsewhere….”45  Eyewitness evidence supports this contention.  
Observing ambulance volunteers declining to retrieve the wounded from an active battle in late-
September, Labouchère suggested that people enrolled in the Parisian ambulances and hospitals 
to avoid combat.46  On 1 October Labouchère confirmed this proposition: “The complaints of the 
newspapers against the number of young men who avoid military duty by hooking themselves on 
in some capacity or other to an ambulance are becoming louder everyday.”47  Another writer 
described a similar scenario during the siege: “…Many of the young French swells, to keep from 
going into the field, had donned the ambulance uniform and passed their time loafing about the 
cafés in the Boulevards.”48  Finally, Professor Léon Le Fort received a report indicating that, in 
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Paris and in the provinces, men hoping to avoid military service were found dressed as volunteer 
nurses with the Red Cross armband.49  
Eyewitnesses also observed abuses of the Geneva Convention’s neutrality statute.  The 
Geneva Convention “explicitly protected ambulances and personnel from requisitions and 
invading armies.”50  Writers often described situations in which individuals exploited the 
Convention, establishing makeshift hospitals and ambulances in their apartments and homes 
under the flag of the Red Cross; by providing limited aid to a small number of wounded, these 
individuals hoped that they would be relieved of wartime requisitioning and billeting 
responsibilities.  Labouchère described seeing the Red Cross flag waving on “far too many 
houses.  From my window I can count fifteen houses with this flag floating over them.”51  The 
acerbic Edmond de Goncourt perceptively observed that “the wounded man…is an object of 
utility….He defends your dwelling from invasion by the suburban population; he will save you 
later from fire, pillage, and Prussian requisition.”52  Additionally, Goncourt recounted a story 
heard from an acquaintance in which a Parisian, searching for patients to fill the makeshift 
hospital in his house, visited a local hospital and paid three thousand francs to obtain the 
facility’s wounded.53  As argued earlier, the 1864 Geneva Convention instituted no disciplinary 
measures to ensure the proper usage of the Red Cross flag, an oversight that likely contributed to 
the widespread abuse of this emblem. 
 In addition to commenting on the disorganization and abuses within ambulances and 
hospitals, contemporary observers described the unsanitary conditions in Parisian medical 
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facilities.  These remarks focused on the lack of adequate ventilation and the proliferation of 
infection and disease.  When discussing inadequate ventilation and poor sanitation, individuals 
frequently referenced the temporary hospital in the Grand Hôtel.  In late December 1870, 
Labouchère wrote that the selection of the hotel as a hospital site had been “a great mistake, 
owing to the want of ventilation the simplest operations are usually fatal.”54  Nathan Sheppard 
provided similar grim statistics for the Grand Hôtel, suggesting that “…not more than one in ten 
who are taken there return alive.”55  Other Parisian medical facilities were also deemed 
unsanitary and prone to infection and disease.  Charles Gordon, a British surgeon in France 
during the Franco-Prussian War, described the poorly ventilated rooms of the Corps Législatif 
ambulance as “nests of infection and danger to their wounded occupants.”56  Gordon condemned 
the French practice of converting existing structures into ambulances and hospitals, suggesting 
that “as a rule, no public or private building not originally erected as a hospital is suitable for the 
reception of wounded men.”57  Gordon provided additional information about the unsanitary 
conditions of Parisian medical facilities, claiming that “hospital disease”—infections and illness 
contracted in hospitals and ambulances—was the cause of the majority of deaths among the 
city’s wounded.58   
 The American ambulance provided a contrast to the disorganized and unsanitary 
conditions in most Parisian ambulances and hospitals.  The American dentist Dr. Thomas Evans 
provided the impetus for the establishment of the American ambulance.  In his survey on Dr. 
Evans’ experiences in Paris, Gerald Carson asserts that Evans “felt a deep commitment to bring 
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together in usable form the lessons of sanitation and hygiene he had drawn from his personal 
experience and observation, and to publicize again the contribution that a private, volunteer 
organization could make in reducing the horrors of war.”59  
Dr. Evans and a group of American citizens met in Paris on 18 July 1870 to discuss the 
formation of an aid service for the wounded on both sides of the conflict.  In the words of Dr. 
Evans, this aid organization served as a  “practical demonstration of the improved methods of 
treating the wounded, whose results, as illustrated by the experience of the ‘United States 
Sanitary Commission’ and the American Government, I had been endeavoring…to bring to…the 
friends of sanitary reform throughout the world.”60  Created in June 1861, the Sanitary 
Commission operated during the American Civil War as a voluntary citizens’ association that 
worked with the Army Medical Bureau to provide aid for the wounded.61  Realizing the 
inefficiencies and “cumbrous nature” of the French ambulance system, Evans and his colleagues 
wanted their aid service to remain “a distinctly American organization.”62  The group established 
the American International Sanitary Committee, a five-person council charged with directing the 
American ambulance and coordinating with other aid societies in France, and Dr. Evans donated 
ten thousand francs and the contents of the United States Sanitary Commission’s exhibit from the 
1867 Paris Exposition to the service of the American ambulance.63  The necessary preparations 
for the ambulance were completed with the erecting of hospital tents on the Avenue de 
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l’Impératrice in Paris on 1 September, and the service functioned for the duration of the Prussian 
siege, disbanding on 26 March 1871.64 
 The structure of the ambulance and the treatment methods utilized by the ambulance staff 
contributed to the American facility’s commendable medical performance during the siege.  
More specifically, Dr. Evans pinpointed the reasons for the success of the American ambulance: 
the preference of tents instead of solid buildings; the careful attention paid to hygienic 
conditions; and the employment of medical and surgical knowledge gained from the American 
Civil War.65  The use of tents instead of existing buildings for housing the wounded was a 
crucial element of sanitary care in the American ambulance.  The tent system of the American 
ambulance consisted of a variety of “oil-smeared impermeable canvas” structures, including 
tents for wounded soldiers, a large round tent for wounded officers, and other tents for storage, 
washing, food preparation, and staff quarters.66  “What Evans had in mind,” Gerald Carson 
notes, “Was to set up a field hospital under canvas, instead of crowding the sick and wounded 
into churches and public buildings, as was customarily done in Europe.”67  Portable and 
relatively cheap, these tents could be quickly disassembled if an outbreak of disease occurred.68  
As Taithe explains, “The American model largely reconstructed the experience of mobility,…of 
a war of movement in the open fields where illness was the enemy and could be eluded 
physically.”69  Discussing the advantages of a tent system, Charles Gordon indicated that the 
occurrence of “hospital disease” was “apparently at its minimum” in temporary structures of 
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canvas and wood and that the benefits of tent-hospitals were “so apparent as the siege advanced, 
that their further extension was in progress at the time the capitulation of Paris took place.”70  
 The American ambulance staff used certain treatment procedures during the siege of 
Paris.  These included: sufficient ventilation; battle-tested treatment options and skilled surgeons; 
and an organized wagon service for conveying the wounded to the ambulance tents.  Writing 
about the benefit of ample air circulation, Dr. Crane noted that “the conditions under which the 
wounded were treated at our ambulance differed in no essential respect from those existing in the 
other ambulances at Paris, except in so far as the patients were more directly exposed to the 
influence of open air.”71  Although perhaps an overstatement, Dr. Crane’s remark highlights the 
premium that the American ambulance staff placed on proper ventilation.  Labouchère theorized 
that many lives could be saved if the American ventilation scheme was used in all Parisian 
hospitals.72  Serving the dual purpose of keeping the inside of the ambulance comfortable and 
helping to foster continuous air movement, a coal-burning stove placed in a nearby ditch piped 
warm, dry air into the tents.  Observers estimated that with an external temperature of 25 degrees 
Fahrenheit, the American tents maintained an interior temperature of 55 degrees Fahrenheit.73  
 The medical treatments used in the American ambulance were known to be reliable.  
“Drawing on experiments made and knowledge acquired during the Civil war,” Christiansen 
explains, “It [the American ambulance] represented the last word in medical modernity.”74  In 
addition to exposure to fresh air, the ambulance staff treated the wounded with hot and cold 
water, quinine, opium, and beds stuffed with naturally antiseptic seaweed.75  Moreover, the 
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surgeons in the American ambulance were experienced in war surgery.  Gordon observed that 
the American ambulance produced the most satisfactory results among the Parisian facilities that 
treated gunshot wounds.76  Elihu Washburne, the United States Minister to France, pointed out in 
December 1870 that Dr. John Swinburne, the chief surgeon in the American ambulance, “Is 
exciting the admiration of all Paris by his successful operations at the American ambulance.”77 
 The American ambulance’s wagon service for transporting the wounded was more 
practical and more efficient than the wagon services of the French-sponsored ambulances.  
Consequently, wounded soldiers were conveyed more quickly and more comfortably—without 
aggravation to their injuries—in the American wagons.  Haller describes the American 
ambulance’s wagon as “exceedingly durable compared to European designs,” noting that the 
American design received a prize given to the best ambulance at the 1867 Paris Exposition.78  In 
contrast, Dr. Marion Sims of the Anglo-American ambulance “criticized the French medical 
evacuation system as cumbersome and unsuited for the realities of war.”79  Additionally, George 
Boyland vividly recounted a wounded officer’s traumatic experience in a French ambulance 
wagon: “A wounded captain, who was borne upon one of these, exclaimed to us, ‘For the love of 
God, gentlemen, take me down and let me die.’”80  Stocked with twelve ambulance wagons, a 
number of stretchers, and “all the material necessary for the transport and care of the wounded,” 
the American ambulance garnered widespread approval for its medical transport system during 
the siege.81  According to Dr. Evans, the American wagon was “so excellent, so well adapted to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
76 Gordon, 127. 
77 E.B. Washburne, Recollections of a Minister to France, 1869-1877 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889), 
259. 
78 Haller, 47. 
79 Haller, 69. 
80 Boyland, 46. 
81 Evans, 36. 
 
 16
all the contingencies of waggon [sic] transport” that the French Society requested a similar 
model.82   
 Contemporary observers—French and foreign—frequently extolled the American 
ambulance for its methods, organization, clean environment, and medical success.  For example, 
Felix Whitehurst wrote, “The whole of the American arrangements are admirable, and especially 
should be mentioned their waggons [sic], which carry four wounded in perfect comfort….”83  
Additionally, Nathan Sheppard described the ambulance’s “neat and tasteful grounds, its ample 
and well ventilated hospital tents,…the skill of Surgeon Swinburne, and the energy and fidelity 
of his fellow-workers on the field and at the bedside.”84  While Elihu Washburne believed that 
the American ambulance was superior to any French army ambulance, Wickham Hoffman 
asserted that the American ambulance “did better work than any of the other ambulance[s] in 
Paris.”85  French eyewitnesses also marveled at the achievements of the American aid facility.  
In his history of the American ambulance, Dr. Evans filled approximately thirty pages with 
examples of the Parisian press’ admiration for the American service.  French medical personnel 
also praised the American ambulance.  According to Washburne, the French physician Dr. 
Ricord “expressed the greatest satisfaction with the ambulance, and give[s] it the preference over 
all the ambulances of Paris.”86  Additionally, on 21 September 1870 Washburne wrote that the 
Surgeon General of the French army visited the American ambulance, giving “the highest kind 
of compliment to that institution.”87   
                                                 
82 Evans, 73; Dr. Evans also noted that by 1 January 1871 the American model had become the primary wagon used 
to retrieve the wounded, 73. 
83 Whitehurst, 1:220. 
84 Sheppard, 266. 
85 Washburne, 1:144; Hoffman, 222. 
86 Washburne, 1:222. 
87 Washburne 1:144. 
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 A final comparison of the mortality rates within the American ambulance with those of 
certain other French-sponsored medical facilities testifies to the medical success of the American 
ambulance and highlights the stark contrast between the two services.  Alistair Horne notes that 
four out of every five patients died following amputations in the Grand Hôtel hospital, but only 
one patient out of every five died after similar surgery in the American facility.88  While the 
Grand Hôtel hospital witnessed a 45 percent mortality rate overall, the American ambulance’s 
mortality rate was 3.3 percent during the opening weeks of the siege; as the siege progressed, 
shortages of provisions and fuel caused this figure to climb to 19 percent, still a much lower 
percentage than that of the Grand Hôtel or any other medical facility in Paris.89  Gordon’s 
mortality statistics support this contention: the Ambulance de la Presse experienced a 22 percent 
mortality rate; the Ambulance de la Marine had a mortality rate of approximately 25 percent; 
and, in agreement with Evans, the American ambulance had a 19 percent mortality rate.90 
 Throughout the duration of the Prussian siege of Paris, French and foreign observers 
consistently praised the American ambulance.  Organized by Dr. Thomas Evans and a handful of 
Americans in Paris, the American ambulance represented an efficient, hygienic system of aid 
that functioned more successfully in caring for the wounded than its French-sponsored 
counterparts.  This essay has argued that the acclaim for the American facility resulted from the 
contrast between the sanitary conditions, organization, and medical success of the American 
ambulance and those of the majority of hospitals and ambulances operating during the Franco-
Prussian War and the siege of Paris.  “Though the military, political, and strategic aspects of the 
Franco-Prussian War have been fully recorded,” Valentine Swain notes, “Little attention has 
                                                 
88 Horne, 175. 
89 Evans, 43-44. 
90 Gordon, 120-121. 
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been given to the medical side of the bitter struggle.”91  This essay has sought to partially rectify 
this situation by adding the experience of the American ambulance to the studies of medical aid 







































                                                 
91 Valentine A.J. Swain, “Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871: Voluntary Aid for the Wounded and Sick,” 
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